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The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act and Cell Location Data
IS THE WHOLE MORE THAN
THE SUM OF ITS PARTS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Cellular phones permit law enforcement to identify
their users’ locations and track their movements.1 This is an
enormously powerful tool in the hands of police and
prosecutors, who have recently used the technology to solve
and prosecute high profile crimes.2 In New York City, the police
arrested a night club bouncer after calls from his cell phone
placed him near where the body of a murder victim was
dumped.3 In California, the evidence used to convict Scott
Peterson of murdering his wife included location data gleaned
from his cell phone that undermined his alibi.4 Perhaps more
importantly, other crimes have been prevented from
happening.5 In one case, a thief stole a woman’s car with her
child and her cell phone inside.6 The police were able to stop
1
See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search and Seizure: Updating Privacy
Protections to Keep Pace With Technology, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY
LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 505 (PLI Pat.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 8966, 2006).
This data is collectively referred to as “cell site data” or “cell site information” by
various cases and commentators. This Note will refer to data taken from the
transmissions of a cell phone that reveal the phone’s physical location as “cell location
data.” There are different types of this data, each of which has different features and
may require its own legal analysis. When referring to these specific types of cell
location data, this Note will use a term that indicates what type is being discussed. See
infra Part II.
2
Stephen V. Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2006, at 5.
3
Nancie L. Katz, Bouncer Pleads Not Guilty in Death of Graduate Student,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 2006.
4
Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial: Defendant Lied Often,
Recorded Calls Show Supporters Misled About Whereabouts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26,
2004, at B1.
5
Treglia, supra note 2.
6
Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 22,
2004, at A18 [hereinafter Girl, 5]; see also Treglia, supra note 2 (citing this incident as
an example of how “cell phone mapping” has prevented crimes in progress).
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the car and rescue the child within thirty minutes by tracking
the woman’s cell phone.7 Yet with each increase in law
enforcement’s power to conduct surveillance comes an
increased concern for individual privacy. Numerous
commentators have expressed concern over the ease with
which the government has accessed data from individuals’ cell
phones that reveals their whereabouts and permits real-time
tracking.8
There is currently no federal statute that explicitly
strikes the balance between privacy and the needs of law
enforcement in the context of cell phone tracking.9 Moreover,
unless police surveillance discloses that the target was at home
when his or her cell phone transmissions were monitored, the
Fourth Amendment appears to provide no protection.10 It seems
that prior to August of 2005 law enforcement agencies
requested, and were routinely granted, the authority to access
cell location data with minimal judicial oversight.11 In that
month, a federal district court in New York, after soliciting an
amicus brief from privacy advocates, issued an opinion denying
the government’s application for access to an individual’s cell
location data and stated that it would not grant any such
application without a showing of probable cause.12 Since then, a
slew of district courts have considered whether the Electronic
7

Girl, 5, supra note 6.
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 529, 537 (noting that until recently the
government routinely received cell site information on a less than probable cause
basis); JAY STANLEY, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESS AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 14 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/
surveillance_report.pdf; Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Modern Panopticon:
Law Enforcement Acquisition of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, 13 RICHMOND J.L.
& TECH. 16, 16 (2007); see also M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41
VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2006) (noting the advantages of cell phone tracking for law
enforcement); Stephanie Lockwood, Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve
Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 311 (2004).
9
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 533.
10
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
11
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537.
12
In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use
of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information (E.D.N.Y. I), 384 F. Supp. 2d 562,
563-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). At the very least, prior to E.D.N.Y. I, there were no published
opinions denying such applications. Because the names of the published cases are
extremely unwieldy, this Note will refer to the cases by the jurisdiction in which they
were decided. Where a single jurisdiction has produced more than one published
opinion, a Roman numeral will indicate the opinion’s chronological position within that
jurisdiction’s published opinions.
8
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Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), taken together
with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (“CALEA”) and the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”), permits the government to compel a phone company to
disclose such information on a lesser showing than probable
cause, or whether the government must obtain a warrant to
access cell location data.13 A majority of the cases have held
that a warrant is required for the contested types of data,
although they have produced varying analyses of the issue.14
This Note argues that a warrant issued upon probable
cause is the appropriate form of authorization for law
enforcement to conduct certain types of surveillance made
possible by cell location data.15 To reach that conclusion, this
Note analyzes the leading opinions to date and concludes that
the government’s argument is irredeemably flawed. Part II of
this Note discusses the technology of cellular telephony, with a
special emphasis on the features of cellular phones that reveal
their users’ locations. Particular emphasis is placed on
identifying the different kinds of data that can be gleaned from
cell phone transmissions. Part III explains the statutory and
13
See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with
Cell Site Location Authority (Texas I), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(denying government request); In re Application of the United States for an Order (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information (E.D.N.Y. II), 396 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying government request); In re Application of
the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and
Other Information (Texas II), 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (granting
government’s request); In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or
Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking (Texas III), 441
F. Supp. 2d 816, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (denying government request); In re Application
of the United States of America for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications
Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace (S.D.N.Y. I),
405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 436 (S.D.N.Y 2005) (approving government request). For a
discussion of probable cause and the warrant requirement, see infra note 51.
14
This Note will confine its discussion, to the extent possible, to the opinions
of Magistrate Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas (Texas I and Texas III),
and the single opinion of Magistrate Judge Gorenstein (S.D.N.Y. I). These opinions
offer the most cogent analyses of the competing theories. For a discussion of these
cases, see infra Part IV. As of this writing, the other cases that have rejected law
enforcement’s arguments include: In re Application of the United States of America for
an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information (E.D. Wis.),
No. 06-Misc-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006); In re Application for
an Order Authorizing the Installation and use of a Pen Register and Directing the
Disclosure of Telecommunications Records for the Cellular Phone Assigned the
Number [Sealed] (Maryland III), 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 456-57 (D. Md. 2006).
15
For a discussion of tracking devices and the probable cause requirement,
see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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constitutional context of the “cell site cases.” This discussion
highlights the features of federal legislation that law
enforcement and privacy advocates have used in making their
respective arguments. Part IV analyzes the cases that have
considered law enforcement applications to obtain cell location
data and offers a critique of the analyses the cases have
produced. Part V concludes the Note by suggesting statutory
amendments that would remediate the ambiguities in the
statutes and address the policy concerns raised by warrantless
cell phone monitoring.
II.

TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Wireless telephony operates through a network of cell
towers that emit radio frequencies capable of carrying the
human voice and other data.16 Cell towers operate much like a
conventional radio tower, but emit radio frequencies at a
comparatively low power.17 The same frequencies, therefore,
can be used by a nearby tower without having the signals from
one tower interfere with those of another.18 This innovation is
at the core of cellular technology, permitting many people in a
relatively small area to communicate using the same radio
frequencies.19 Because there will be a greater number of users
in densely packed urban areas than in rural and suburban
areas, cell towers are much closer together in big cities.20 The
cells themselves are thought of as hexagonal zones, with a cell
tower sitting wherever three hexagons meet.21 The spot at
which the cell tower sits is referred to as the “cell site.”22 Each
cell might therefore be serviced by six different towers, any one
or all of which could pick up the signal of a phone located

16
See Marshall Brain & Jeff Tyson, How Cell Phones Work, available at
http://www22.verizon.com/about/community/learningcenter/articles/displayarticle1/0,,
1008z1,00.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). The present controversy deals with police
surveillance via conventional wireless telephony and does not involve Global
Positioning Systems (“GPS”) technology. Although related, the legal questions those
technologies pose are distinct from the ones present in the cell location cases.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. Radio frequencies are a naturally limited resource. Id.
20
See Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Cellular Telephone Basics, Jan. 1,
2006, http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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within the cell.23 The area within a cell that is serviced by a
particular tower is a “cell sector.”24
Cell phones are in near-constant communication with
surrounding cell towers.25 When turned “on” a cell phone
automatically searches for the strongest signal available.26
Once the phone selects the best signal, it transmits the user’s
identifying data (the subscriber’s ten-digit phone number and a
thirty-two-digit number unique to the phone itself), so that the
subscriber’s network knows how to route incoming calls, and so
that the cell tower can “hand off” the user’s phone to another
tower if that tower can provide better reception.27 This process
is called “registration” and takes place every seven seconds.28
Data generated during registration (“registration data”) is one
of several kinds of cell location data that law enforcement
might use to locate an individual without listening in on any of
her communications.29 Cell site data, because it only identifies
the individual cell tower with which the phone is
communicating, can reveal only the general location of the
user.30 Other features of wireless telephony, however, permit
law enforcement to pinpoint the user with much greater
accuracy.
One of these features is the “facing.” The typical cell
tower has three sets of panels, each of which sends and receives
signals in a 120-degree arc.31 It is possible to determine which
set of panels, or “face” is communicating with a subscriber’s
cell phone, thereby indicating which third of the tower’s
circumference contains the target phone (“facing data”).32 Law
enforcement can also ascertain the strength of a cell phone
signal (“signal strength data”), which increases as the phone
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. Registration establishes the “control channel,” the two frequencies the
phone and tower use to guide incoming and outgoing calls through the network. It is
important to note that the control channel does not carry any content of the
communications sent by the cell user. Even once the phone is registered, the phone
continues to send its identifying information every seven seconds, in part to make sure
that the hand off to another cell tower is seamless. See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 75051.
29
See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
30
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449; see also Farley & van der Hoek, supra
note 20.
31
Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 20.
32
Id.
24
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gets nearer to the tower and decreases as it goes farther away.33
A cell phone’s location can be determined still more precisely by
a process called “triangulation.”34 Triangulation compares
information from multiple towers, measuring either the angle
at which the phone’s signal strikes the towers’ faces or the
difference in time it takes the signal to reach the different
towers.35 All of this data is produced as the phone registers and
reregisters, as well as at the beginning and end of each call
made and received (“initiation/termination data”).36
There is one final aspect of the technology that is
crucially important: cell phone companies store all this data.37
Law enforcement may request that a service provider turn over
the cell location data it has stored among its subscriber records
(“historical data”) or that the service provider turn over records
on an ongoing basis (“prospective data”).38 It is this latter type
of data that permits real-time tracking of individuals.39
In sum, cell location data can reveal a user’s position
with varying degrees of precision depending on the
concentration of cell towers in a given area and the type of
information that law enforcement is able to access.40 Law
enforcement can request data sets defined by the precision with
which they can locate the subject phone (cell site, facing, signal
strength, and triangulation data) or based on the process that
generated the signals (initiation/termination data and
33
34

See Brain & Tyson, supra note 16.
Lockwood, supra note 8, at 308 (cited in Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751

n.5).
35
Id. at 308-09. It is important to note the differences in precision with which
each data set is capable of locating a phone. The government has argued, and some
courts have accepted, that a warrant is not required to locate and/or track suspects if
the monitoring is done with less precision. See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449; see
also Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537. (Data taken from triangulation techniques will be
referred to as “triangulation data.”)
36
Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 20. As with data produced during
registration, the signals at the beginning and end of the call do not carry any content of
the communications. If law enforcement were to access call initiation/termination data,
but not registration data, then it could only spot check a person’s whereabouts, rather
than monitor his or her movements for an extended period of time.
37
See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification
System on Telephone Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed] and the Production of Real Time
Cell Site Information (Maryland I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005).
38
Id.
39
Id. (noting that “real-time data” is a subset of prospective data).
40
Because there are several different types of data sets at issue in this
controversy, “cell location data” will be used as a blanket term to refer to any data that
permits law enforcement to locate or track an individual using cell phone signals. “Cell
site data” will refer to cell location data from a single cell tower.
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automatic registration data.)41 A data set that includes
triangulation and signal strength data permits the tracking of
an individual with the greatest possible degree of precision,
while cell site data can indicate only generally where a target
is or was located. Initiation/termination data can reveal the
phone user’s location at the time he or she made or received a
call, while registration data can betray the user’s location at all
times the phone was turned on. Finally, all of the data sets can
be made available as historical data (data which exists in
phone company records prior to the time a court order
compelling its disclosure is issued) or as prospective data (data
not in existence when the order is issued, but which is turned
over to law enforcement on an ongoing basis throughout the
time period set out in the order).42 The types of data law
enforcement sought in the various published decisions have
affected the courts’ decisions to grant or deny law enforcement
access to it, although as this Note argues, the only distinction
that matters under the ECPA, properly construed, is the
distinction between historical and prospective data.43
III.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Fourth Amendment does not protect information
that is voluntarily disclosed to third parties.44 Because cell
phone users disclose their location to the phone company in
order for the company to process their calls, there is probably
no constitutional protection for most cell location data.45 The
Fourth Amendment only prohibits warrantless surveillance of

41

See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
See Maryland I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
43
See infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
44
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (records of phone
calls held by phone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)
(financial records held by bank); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
(financial and tax records held by accountant); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
302 (1966) (statements made to confidential informant); see also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s
Guide To The Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide To Amending It, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004).
45
One magistrate involved in this controversy adopted a rather narrow view
of the voluntarism of cell site transmissions, stating that at least with regard to
automatically generated registration data, the phone user cannot be said to have
“voluntarily conveyed” cell site data to the phone company. Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at
756-57. Another court differed, noting that “the individual has chosen to carry a device
and to permit transmission of its information to a third party, the [phone service]
carrier.” S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449-50. If the former analysis is correct, there
may be a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim to protect registration data.
42
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suspects in their homes.46 Constraints on government
acquisition of cell location data (and many other forms of
electronic surveillance) are therefore primarily statutory—a
state of affairs that is consistent with the history of electronic
surveillance law.47
Given the lack of constitutional protection, one might
find it surprising that there is currently no statute that
explicitly regulates governmental access to cell location data.48
Grappling with the ambiguities in existing electronic
surveillance laws, courts have asked whether prospective cell
location data should be treated like the data provided by a
tracking device installed by the police, or rather, whether the
data should be treated like subscriber records, such as the
record of numbers dialed by the target phone.49 If cell location
data is treated like a tracking device, then governmental access
to it is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, enacted as part the
ECPA.50 A warrant issued pursuant to probable cause would
then be required (in most instances) to locate or track an
individual using his or her cell phone.51 If cell location data is
better analyzed as a form of “subscriber record,” then law
46

Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1984) (Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant to monitor a tracking device that is within the target’s
home), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (no warrant required if a
tracking device is monitored while the target in on public roads.).
47
See Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian
Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 72 (2006) (noting that, although the
customary view is to see the judiciary turning the “constitutional ratchet” to provide
greater protection for civil liberties than legislatures would require, Congress found
itself providing more privacy protection from electronic surveillance than the Fourth
Amendment required throughout most of the Twentieth Century.)
48
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 533.
49
See, e.g., Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750, 753. What might have been a
more straightforward debate over the proper statutory interpretation is complicated by
the fact that cell location data provides the same information as tracking devices while
taking the form of subscriber records. Cell location data is therefore amenable to both
analogies.
50
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
51
The law governing tracking devices is not entirely settled. Although a
warrant is not constitutionally required to install and monitor a tracking device so long
as the target remains in the public realm, it is usually impossible for government
agents to know in advance whether a tracking device will disclose that the target is in
a space, such as the home, where he or she enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant issued pursuant
to probable cause in order to engage in such surveillance. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716-17.
Because of the uncertainty over what the tracking device will reveal, the prudent
magistrate will insist on a showing of probable cause before authorizing the
installation of such a device. See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52; JAMES G. CARR &
PATRICIA L. BELLIA, 1 THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:83, at 4-207 (West
2007).
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enforcement needs only to obtain a court order upon a showing
of “specific and articulable facts” demonstrating relevance to an
ongoing criminal investigation, per the terms of the SCA.52 This
is a much lighter burden for law enforcement to meet.53 Law
enforcement agencies argue for the lighter burden of proof,
advancing a “hybrid theory” that combines two distinct grants
of authority found in different statutes to authorize cell
location/tracking, which neither statute recognizes on its own.54
A final consideration when analyzing the appropriate
legal framework is that the provisions of the SCA alone appear
to be sufficient to grant law enforcement access to historical
cell location data.55 The present controversy therefore deals
with a question that is significantly narrower than whether
law enforcement may access cell location data without a
warrant. More precisely, the question is whether prospective
cell location data (from the very general “cell site data” to the
very precise “real-time triangulation data”) is accessible by law
enforcement subject to the same strictures that govern the use
of conventional tracking devices.56 The arguments advanced by
law enforcement agencies and by privacy advocates have
addressed this precise question.
A.

Law Enforcement’s “Hybrid Theory”

The government has claimed statutory authority to
access cell location data under a theory that combines the
authority granted by multiple statutes.57 The hybrid theory
posits that federal district courts have the authority to compel
the disclosure of prospective cell location data when they issue
an order for a pen register58 in conjunction with an order for
stored subscriber records.59 Advocates of this theory argue that
it fulfills the intent of Congress as expressed in the ECPA and

52

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
54
See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758 n.13; see also infra Part IV.A.
55
See Maryland I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
56
For a discussion of the law regarding tracking devices, see supra note 51
and accompanying text.
57
The term “hybrid theory” was first used in Texas I, see 396 F. Supp. 2d 747,
758 n.13.
58
A pen register is the device that law enforcement agents use to record the
“dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” transmitted by the target
phone. Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761 n.17 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006)).
59
Id. at 761.
53
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harmonizes the text of the relevant statutes to form a coherent
scheme of surveillance regulation.60
The first building block of the hybrid theory is the
Pen/Trap Statute.61 The Pen/Trap Statute is part of Title III of
the ECPA.62 It governs the installation and use of pen registers
and trap/trace devices.63 The USA PATRIOT Act added the
term “signaling information,” expanding the pen register’s
previous scope to encompass all signaling information
transmitted as part of an electronic communication.64 The
Pen/Trap Statute provides that a judge “shall enter an ex parte
order” compelling the cooperation of an electronic
communications service provider where a government attorney
has certified that the information likely to be obtained from the
pen/trap device is “relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”65 This limited form of review exists “merely to
safeguard against purely random use of [pen and trap/trace]
device[s],”66 while ensuring that the devices are promptly
available to law enforcement agencies.67 “Certified relevance” is
the lowest evidentiary burden the ECPA imposes upon law
enforcement.68 Orders for pen/trap devices are the only ones
that may be issued on such a minimal showing.69 Pen/trap
authority is granted with minimal judicial oversight because

60

S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49.
See id. at 438.
62
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
63
Id. A pen register records the numbers of all outgoing calls made by the
target phone, as well as the time and duration of those phone calls. A trap/trace device
records the numbers of all phones that place calls to the target phone. Id.; see also 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2006).
64
USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272,
288-90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2001)). (“USA PATRIOT Act” is an
acronym for the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.) This amendment is important to
hybrid theory advocates, because “signaling information” can potentially cover
automatic registration data, whereas dialing, routing and addressing information
cannot. Because registration data permits law enforcement to track cell phones even
when there is no call in progress, its accessibility greatly increases the government’s
power to engage in surveillance. See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39; see also
supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
65
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006).
66
United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990).
67
CARR & BELLIA, supra note 51, § 4:81, at 4-200 to -201; see also In re
Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing Installation and
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 (M.D. Fla.
1994).
68
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
69
See id.
61
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Congress believed that the disclosure of this information is
minimally invasive.70
Because the target phone transmits cell location data,
pen registers, not trap/trace devices identify the phone user’s
location.71 If the hybrid theory correctly asserts that cell
location data is “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information,”72 then the terms of the Pen/Trap Statute alone
permits law enforcement to access cell location data on a
showing of certified relevance. There is, however, an exception
to the Pen/Trap Statute, codified elsewhere in the United
States Code, which regards cell location data.73 The language of
this exception clearly prevents cell location data from being
disclosed to law enforcement under the authority of the
Pen/Trap Statute and, therefore, on the minimal showing of
certified relevance:
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the
authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in
section 3127 of Title 18), such call-identifying information shall not
include any information that may disclose the physical location of
the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be
determined from the telephone number) . . . .74

The hybrid theory relies on the language “solely
pursuant to” for the assertion that Congress intended the
Pen/Trap Statute, supplemented by some other, unspecified
form of authority, to permit cell phone location and tracking.75
The semantic implication of the term “solely” becomes the
lynchpin in the government’s argument; if the word were not
there, it would be clear that Congress forbade the use of pen
registers to obtain cell location data. Because Congress did
include the phrase “solely pursuant to,” the government’s
argument that “signaling information,” per the Pen/Trap
Statute, is accessible by law enforcement when conjoined with
some other statutory grant of authority has a plausible textual
70
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (“Legal process [under the ECPA] is
calibrated to the degree of intrusion. So ‘the greater the privacy interest at stake, the
higher the [evidentiary] threshold Congress uses.’” Id. at 829 (quoting Orin S. Kerr,
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 607, 620-21 (2003)).
71
See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439 n.2.
72
See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
73
Id. at 440.
74
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006) (enacted as part of CALEA) (emphasis
added).
75
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
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basis.76 The other grants of authority that the ECPA provides
are included in the provisions governing wiretaps,77 tracking
devices78 and stored communications and subscriber records
such as email.79 Proponents of the hybrid theory argue that the
SCA provides the compliment to pen register authority, as
required by the “exception clause.”80 From the government’s
perspective, the SCA is an attractive candidate for this role
because, after the Pen/Trap Statute, the SCA places the lowest
evidentiary burden on the law enforcement agency seeking
such an order.81 It is also a textual fit; the critical section
providing in pertinent part:
[A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service] to disclose a record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not
including the contents of communications) . . . if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.82

This final step in the hybrid theory fits together with the
Pen/Trap Statute because of the breadth of the terms “records
or other information.” Cell location data could fairly be
conceptualized as “other information.”83 Various federal courts
have accepted this theory, issuing orders for the release of
stored communications (under the SCA) and for the use of a
pen register (under the Pen/Trap Statute) to access prospective
cell location data.84
In summary, the government’s hybrid theory seeks the
authority to locate and track individuals on a prospective basis
(as opposed to simply determining where they have been in the
past) by accessing the data gleaned from their cellular phone
transmissions. Although it is conceptually coherent to think of
this data as analogous to the dialing and addressing records
76

S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006); see also Kerr, supra note 69, at 620
(referring to the authority for a wiretap as a “superwarrant”).
78
18 U.S.C. § 3117; see also Texas I, F. Supp. 2d at 752.
79
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring an intermediate showing of “specific and
articulable facts”) (enacted as part of the SCA).
80
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49.
81
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753
82
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(d) (2006).
83
See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 444-48.
84
See infra Part IV.
77
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accessible by a pen register, Congress has unambiguously
forbidden the Pen/Trap Statute, standing alone, to authorize
cell phone tracking. The SCA (the Stored Communications Act),
clearly authorizes the disclosure of historical cell location data
but cannot, by its terms, compel the disclosure of prospective
data.85 Because prospective cell data, especially data obtained
in real-time, is much more valuable to law enforcement, the
government has sought to combine the forward-looking grant of
authority found in the Pen/Trap Statute with the authority to
access “subscriber records” granted by the SCA in order to
overcome the prohibition against using the Pen/Trap Statute as
the sole authority for locating individuals.86 Accepting the
hybrid theory means accepting that the Pen/Trap Statute and
the SCA, taken together, grant the government more power to
conduct electronic surveillance than either statute grants on its
own.
B.

Privacy Advocates’ Tracking Device Theory

Those who oppose law enforcement access to cell
location data on a showing of specific and articulable facts
argue very simply that, “[w]hile the cell phone was not
originally conceived as a tracking device, law enforcement
converts it to that purpose by monitoring cell [location] data.”87
Under this theory, the portion of the ECPA dealing with
tracking devices governs access to prospective cell location
data.88 The term “tracking device” is defined in that section as
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking
of the movement of a person or object.”89 As noted by one
magistrate, the statute regulating the use of tracking devices
applies to a device even if it is not designed to be a tracking
device and even if it serves some purpose other than the
locating or tracking of individuals; the statute applies so long
as a device permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object.90 The same judge observed that 18 U.S.C. § 3117 makes
no mention of the precision with which law enforcement may

85
86
87
88
89
90

Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 759, 759 n.16.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 754.
18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006).
Id.
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. at 753.
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locate the device in question.91 It is therefore irrelevant, for the
purposes of § 3117, whether law enforcement applies for realtime triangulation data or cell site data turned over on an
ongoing basis.92 It might also be noted that the definition of a
tracking device covers a device used simply to locate a target,
as long as the device permits the tracking of the target’s
movement. Once a court accepts that a cell phone is converted
to a tracking device when law enforcement accesses the user’s
cell location data, § 3117 is triggered and law enforcement
should apply for a warrant to obtain the data.93
The preceding discussion delineated the relevant
contours of federal electronic surveillance law and offered a
summary of the two theories competing to govern cell location
data. The plain language of the relevant statutes makes cell
location data amenable to both the hybrid and the tracking
device theories of the ECPA. A decision about which theory
produces the rule that strikes the right balance between
privacy and the needs of law enforcement requires a closer
examination of the opinions that have analyzed the competing
theories.
IV.

THE CELL LOCATION CASES

The difficulty that courts face in the cell location cases
would be understandable if they were confronted only with the
vagaries of the ECPA. The cases are more vexing still because
law enforcement has sought various different types of cell
location data in different cases, and certain courts have found
the differences persuasive.94 Courts on both sides of the
controversy have been embroiled in an effort to produce the
correct textual analysis of the relevant statutes, combining
interpretive virtuosity with a growing record of legislative
history. The following is a closer analysis of the two theories,
viewed through the opinions adopting and rejecting them.

91
92
93
94

827.

Texas I, 396 F. Supp. at 753.
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51.
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537; see also Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at

2007]

A.

THE ECPA AND CELL LOCATION DATA

397

Cases Accepting the Hybrid Theory

Magistrate Judge Gorenstein in the Southern District of
New York decided the primary case accepting the hybrid
theory.95 This is the minority rule, with only four other federal
magistrates joining the analysis in published opinions.96 Cases
following this opinion have made little use of the tools of
statutory interpretation other than a plain reading of the
statutory texts. They do rely to some extent on the legislative
history behind the statutes, including the testimony of former
FBI Director Louis Freeh, appearing before Congress to
support the passage of CALEA.97 Yet the success of the hybrid
theory seems to depend primarily on its textual analysis of the
relevant statutes. This textual analysis needs to demonstrate
that the transmissions from cellular phones are best thought of
as being both “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information” in order for the Pen/Trap Statute to apply and as
a form of “[subscriber] record or other information” in order for
the SCA to apply.98 Courts in the hybrid camp also need to
interpret the “exception clause” as the link that combines the
authority granted by the two statutes.99
An order for the installation of a pen/trap device permits
the capture of all “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information” transmitted by the target phone for a period of up
95

S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site
Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone (S.D.N.Y. III), 2006 WL
3016316, No. 06 Crim. Misc. 01 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006); Texas II, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804
(S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device
and Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone (W. Va. Opinion), 415
F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D. W. Va. 2006); In re Application of the United States for an Order:
(1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device;
and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information
(La. Opinion), 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006). The W.Va. Opinion is exceptional
for recognizing that the exception clause in 47 U.S.C. § 1002 does not apply to the
tracking of an individual who is carrying a cell phone but is not the subscriber of the
phone service. Id. at 665-66. In jurisdictions accepting the hybrid theory, law
enforcement may therefore track a phone that is not in the possession of the subscriber
pursuant to the authority in the Pen/Trap Statute and on the minimal showing of
certified relevance required by that statute. For a full discussion of this point, see infra
notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
97
See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443; La. Opinion, 411 F. Supp. 2d
at 681. For a discussion of Director Freeh’s testimony, see infra text accompanying
notes 177-191.
98
See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-40; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c), 3127(3)
(2006).
99
Id. at 440-43; see also supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
96
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to 60 days from the date the order is issued.100 Courts upholding
the hybrid theory must first accept that cell location data
qualifies as such information. The support for this first step, as
analyzed in S.D.N.Y. I, comes from the fact that cell phones
transmit a signal to cell towers.101 The term “signaling
information,” then, covers “information on the location of cell
towers used by a cellular telephone.”102 The court in S.D.N.Y. I
used the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
added the term “signaling information” to the definition of a
pen register, in order to buttress its conclusion that the term
was meant to cover signals transmitted by cell phones.103 That
history reveals an intention that the term would have a broad
sweep, stating that “‘signaling information’ would ‘apply across
the board to all communications media.’”104
The court’s other argument for bringing cell location
data under the aegis of the Pen/Trap Statute stems from a
pre-USA PATRIOT Act case from the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in which the court found that
signals from a cell phone “which are necessary to achieve
communications between the caller and the party he or she is
calling, clearly are ‘signaling information.’”105 The court in
S.D.N.Y. I presumed that Congress was aware of the
interpretation that the U.S. Telecom court gave to the term
“signaling information” and intended to incorporate that
interpretation into the USA PATRIOT Act.106
100
18 U.S.C. §§ 3123(c), 3127(3) (2006); see also S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at
438 n.1 (noting that in the past the use of a pen register required the actual
installation of a physical device, but that, at least in the Southern District of New
York, the same information is conveyed by the telephone service provider in a digital
format, and that the same standards govern, regardless of the form the data takes).
101
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39.
102
Id. at 439.
103
Id.
104
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001.)). This
reading of the legislative history is contrary to the analysis performed by the court in
Texas I, which “note[d] an absence of legislative history indicating that Congress
intended cell data to be included in this term when it enacted the USA PATRIOT Act.”
Id. at 439 (citing Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761).
105
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (citing U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC,
227 F.3d 450, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). At issue in the U.S. Telecom litigation, inter alia,
was the FCC’s interpretation of this term—in accepting this definition, the D.C. Court
upheld the FCC interpretation. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 227 F.3d at 453.
106
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (citing and quoting Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) for the proposition that “[w]here . . . Congress adopts a new
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have
had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it
affects the new statute.”).
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The next step in the hybrid theory analysis is to find the
authority needed to supplement the Pen/Trap Statute in § 2703
of the SCA.107 The broad language contained in that section of
the SCA makes this step a fairly easy one, and there is little
dispute that historical cell location data could be accessed with
this authority alone.108
The final step for law enforcement to take in order to
gain access to prospective cell data on a showing of “specific
and articulable facts” is to interpret the exception clause
codified by CALEA.109 It is critical to the success of the hybrid
theory that the language “solely pursuant to the authority for
pen registers” be read to mean “pen registers and some other
form of authority in the ECPA.”110 This is so because the
S.D.N.Y. I court, and those that follow it, state not only that
the hybrid theory is a plausible interpretation of the electronic
surveillance laws, but also the only one possible.111 It appears
that the advocacy group appearing as amicus in S.D.N.Y. I had
argued that the exception clause in § 1002 should be read as “a
simple direction that no cell site information may be obtained
pursuant to the Pen Register Statute.”112 The structural
problem with this argument, according to the court, is that if
cell location data is not accessible via a pen register, then it
must not be accessible by law enforcement at all, an obvious
absurdity.113 The court’s thinking goes as follows: a pen register
(or its digital counterpart) is the mechanism by which law
enforcement ascertains the cell site being activated by the
target phone, and if a pen register cannot be involved in
ascertaining the cell site, then Congress has forbidden law
enforcement from using a very powerful tool without explicitly
saying so.114 Although the S.D.N.Y. I court found the “idea of
combining some [statutory] mechanism with as yet
undetermined features of [electronic privacy law] . . . an
unattractive choice,” it saw no other alternative but to accept
the hybrid theory.115
107
108

See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 82-83; see also Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d

at 759 n.16.
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

See supra note 72.
See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44.
Id. at 441-42.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 443-44.
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The court in S.D.N.Y. I provided a plausible reading of
the language in the relevant statutes, yet, as the opinion itself
indicates, “the plain meaning of the words” of an ambiguous
statute is not a strong foundation upon which to ground a
statutory construction.116 Because S.D.N.Y. I and those opinions
adopting its reasoning made little use of the other tools of
statutory construction, and completely ignored the policy
implications of the hybrid theory, its validity remains
questionable. Furthermore, the cases upholding the hybrid
theory do very little to explain why privacy advocates’ theory
is unattractive. At most, the courts accepting the government’s
theory point to the limited precision with which law
enforcement can track an individual, using the crudest form
of cell location data.117 The implication appears to be that,
because certain types of cell location data do not permit the
tracking of a target with the same precision as a conventional
tracking device, the analogy, and the privacy advocates’
argument, must fail.118
Whereas the hybrid theory relies almost entirely on a
tenuous but plausible interpretation of several statutory
sections regulating electronic surveillance, the alternative
theory, which analogizes cell location data to the data derivable
from a conventional tracking device, provides a cogent textual
analysis, and, more importantly, situates that analysis in the
overall structure of electronic surveillance law.
B.

Cases Rejecting the Hybrid Theory

The line of cases that rejects the hybrid theory and
analogizes cell location data to the data taken from a
traditional tracking device has provided a thorough critique of
the hybrid theory and offered its own interpretation of the
relevant statutes.119 The courts falling into this camp have
grounded their decisions in a reading of the statutory texts and
their legislative history that is contrary to the one provided by
the hybrid theory, and, more importantly, in a structural
argument that considers the framework of the ECPA as a
116

S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
See id. at 437-38. For a discussion of cell location data, see supra notes 3136 and accompanying text.
118
For a more complete discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying
notes 160-171.
119
See, e.g., Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827-37; E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d
at 305-08.
117
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whole.120 In seeking congruence with the basic design of the
ECPA, these cases produce a more coherent interpretation of
the ambiguous texts than does the ‘plain meaning’ approach
taken by hybrid theory advocates. The overall soundness of this
holistic approach is evidenced by the fact that the cases
adopting it are by far the majority.121 Yet despite an
increasingly sophisticated and powerful critique of the hybrid
theory, the hybrid’s resilience was demonstrated in October of
2006, when a district judge in the Southern District of New
York joined the hybrid camp.122 The following is a discussion of
the majority line of cases, which supplies various critiques of
the hybrid theory and advances a more coherent alternative.
In light of the pervasive ambiguity in the statutes
relied upon by the two competing theories (none of them
actually mentions locating or tracking cellular phones by their
transmissions), it should come as no surprise that the majority
line of cases can also claim support for its analysis in the
text of the relevant statutes.123 The textual support for the
‘tracking device theory’ is quite sound: it is indisputable that
cell phones “permit the tracking of the movement of a person or
thing.”124 Courts accepting this position have also buttressed
their holdings by referencing legislative history which is—
admittedly—just as ambiguous as the statutes themselves.125
Perhaps most importantly, the majority line of cases has
produced a powerful critique of the hybrid theory. The
following is a discussion of the hybrid theory’s shortcomings
120

See Texas III, at 827-37.
In addition to the E.D.N.Y I and II; Texas I and III; Maryland I and III;
and E.D. Wis. courts, district court opinions rejecting the hybrid theory have been
handed down in the Western District of New York, In re Application of the United
States of America for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register
(W.D.N.Y.), 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y 2006); the District of Columbia, In re
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective
Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2006); In re Applications of the
United States of America for Orders Authorizing Disclosure of Cell Cite Information,
2005 WL 3658531 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); the Southern District of New York, In re
Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 2006 WL 468300, No. 06 CRIM. MISC.
01 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); and in the District of Maryland, In re Application of the
United States of America for Orders Authorizing the Installation and Use of Pen
Registers and Caller Identification Devices on Telephone Numbers [Sealed] and
[Sealed] (Maryland II), 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006).
122
S.D.N.Y. III, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
123
See, e.g., Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
124
See supra text accompanying notes 87-93; 18 U.S.C. 3117 (2006).
125
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 832; E.D.N.Y. I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at
565-66.
121
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identified in the opinions that have rejected it. These
deficiencies are (1) the lack of any text instructing the
combining of the essential statutes; (2) the period of years
separating the enactment of the three critical statutes; (3) the
hybrids’ reliance on the Pen/Trap Statute as the exclusive
source of authority for cell location data; (4) the theory’s
interpretation of the exception clause codified by CALEA; (5)
the significance attached by the hybrid courts to the measure of
precision with which a cell phone user can be tracked; (6) the
lack of persuasive legislative history; (7) inconsistency with the
basic design of the ECPA.126
1. The Lack of Internal Cross-Referencing
Courts rejecting the hybrid theory have questioned the
validity of the theory’s textual analysis. Several courts opposed
to the hybrid theory have pointed out that none of the statutes
that the government claims are meant to be combined even
mentions another.127 Although Congress’ failure to explicitly
instruct the necessary combination is not fatal to the hybrid
theory, it is highly unusual for such a large grant of authority
to law enforcement to receive no explicit mention from either
the statutes alleged to grant such authority or from their
legislative history. As the Supreme Court recently stated while
rejecting an executive-branch claim to broad authority
purported to be nestled in ambiguous statutory language,
“Congress . . . does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.”128 To date, no court putting its imprimatur on the
hybrid theory has offered an explanation for this anomaly.129
2. The Question of the Hybrid Theory’s “Birthday”
One court noted that, in addition to the difficulty in
determining how the ECPA brought the hybrid authority into
being, there is the question of when that authority first
existed.130 The Pen/Trap Statute was enacted as part of the
126
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827-37; W.D.N.Y., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 21719, 218 nn.4-5.
127
See, e.g., Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761. (There is one cross-reference, but
it is the negative instruction found in 47 U.S.C. § 1002.)
128
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
129
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
130
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
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ECPA in 1986.131 CALEA, which contains the exception clause
with its critically important phrase “solely pursuant to,” was
enacted in 1994. The USA PATRIOT Act, which purportedly
expanded the scope of the Pen/Trap Statute to cover
registration data, was not passed until 2001.132 Given this
timeline, accepting the hybrid theory requires accepting that in
1994 CALEA permitted the Pen/Trap Statute (in conjunction
with the SCA) to access cell location data, even though cell
phones were not in widespread use and even though the
Pen/Trap Statute did not authorize the police to engage in
meaningful surveillance of cell location data.133 As with the lack
of internal cross-referencing, hybrid theory proponents have
not made an effort to explain this glitch.134
3. The Pen/Trap Statute as the Exclusive Source for
Cell Location Authority
One of the assertions made by the leading case
accepting the hybrid theory is that the Pen/Trap Statute is the
only possible source of authority by which law enforcement can
access cell location data.135 The faulty syllogism that produces
this conclusion runs as follows: Cell location data is “signaling
information” within the meaning of the Pen/Trap Statute and
therefore accessible via a pen register. The Pen/Trap Statute
states that “no person may install or use a pen register . . .
without first obtaining a court order under [the authority
granted by the Pen/Trap Statute].”136 Because only a pen
register can provide the government with “signaling
information,” it must be that an order for a pen register is a
necessary component of any court order providing cell location
data.137 If this were true, it would greatly undermine the
tracking theory because it would mean that “[a warrant issued
pursuant to probable cause] cannot by [itself] provide authority

131

Pub. L. No. 103-414, Title I, § 103.
Id.
133
See id. (arguing the converse, that is, if cell location data were already
covered by the Pen/Trap Statute, then the 2001 amendment was unnecessary). But see
supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that the government has argued
explicitly that the USA PATRIOT Act added “signaling information” so as to include
cell location data).
134
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
135
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
136
Id. at 441; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 3127(3) (2006).
137
S.D.N.Y .I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
132
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for the Government’s application because any warrant . . . must
necessarily authorize the installation of a ‘pen register.’”138 In
other words, given that only a pen register has the
technological capability to obtain cell location data, to hold that
an order for a pen register is insufficient legal authority to
obtain the same information would mean that the government
cannot obtain cell location data by any means. Such a result,
the court rightfully concludes, cannot be squared with the clear
intention of the relevant statutes.139
Another court responded to this argument, vigorously
attacking the syllogism.140 This second court stated that if the
hybrid theory is correct in this regard, then the “pen/trap
standard is not only a threshold, but also a ceiling,” an equally
bizarre result.141 It then demonstrated that the hybrid court’s
conclusion contravenes some of the basic principles of the
ECPA. The court stated, “One feature of ECPA is that through
use of greater legal process officials can gain access to any
information that they could obtain with lesser process.”142 Even
more convincingly, the court cites the manual published by the
Department of Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section for the proposition that “a § 2703(d) court
order can compel everything that a subpoena can compel (plus
additional information), and a search warrant can compel the
production of everything that a § 2703(d) order can compel (and
then some.)”143 If still more authority were required, the court
critiquing the syllogism discussed a Supreme Court opinion
written before the enactment of the ECPA, which specifically
stated that a warrant could obtain the type of information later
covered by the Pen/Trap Statute.144
There is another serious problem with trying to argue
that a pen register is the exclusive method for accessing cell
location data. First, it is not exactly accurate to state that a pen
register is the device that captures cell location data. The court
in S.D.N.Y. I itself noted that, at least in its own district, a
“pen register” no longer refers to a physical device that agents
138

S.D.N.Y .I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
Id. at 441-42.
140
Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 829-32.
141
Id. at 829.
142
Id. (quoting J. CARR & P. BELLIA, supra note 51, § 4:77, at 4-193 internal
quotes omitted).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 830 (discussing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977),
and noting that it has not been overruled in light of the ECPA).
139
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install on a subscriber’s line.145 On the contrary, data from a
“pen register” now exists in the form of a digital record, which
the phone company provides to law enforcement after receiving
a court order.146 The court noted that in the context of digital
telephony, “[t]he Government has properly assumed that,
despite this change in technology, it is bound to follow the Pen
Register Statute to obtain information otherwise covered by the
statute.”147 The court lost itself in its own fictions when it
asserted that a pen register is the only “device” by which the
government can obtain cell location data.148 By defeating the
argument that only a pen register can access cell location data,
the hybrid theory’s detractors open the possibility that a
warrant issued in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3117 is the
appropriate form of authority.
4. Reading “Solely Pursuant to” in 47 U.S.C. § 1002
Closely tied to its reading of the Pen/Trap Statute, the
court in S.D.N.Y. I read the exception clause in 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002 to mean that an order for a pen register was a necessary
component of an order for cell location data.149 The court stated
that “‘[s]olely’ means ‘without another’ or ‘to the exclusion of all
else.’ If we are told that an act is not done ‘solely’ pursuant to
some authority, it can only mean that the act is done pursuant
to that authority ‘with[] another’ authority.”150 In drawing that
conclusion, the court mistook one possible meaning for the only
available meaning.
The court in Texas III responded by asking us to
“[c]onsider the statement ‘A barrel of oil cannot be purchased
solely with a $5 bill.’”151 The logic employed by the New York
court would lead to the conclusion that no amount of currency
and no property offered as barter could secure the purchase of
a barrel of oil unless it included or was accompanied by a $5
bill. The court in Texas III reached a different conclusion—one
that is amply supported by the design of the ECPA: although
“some amount of legal process” is necessary to obtain cell
145
146
147
148
149
150

S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438 n.1.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 441.
Id. at 440-44.
Id. at 442 (internal citations omitted) (alterations and emphasis in

original).
151

Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
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location data, the authority granted by the Pen/Trap Statute is
not enough.152 The Texas court’s barrel of oil example
demonstrates that the exception clause can be read to mean
that greater legal process could ‘purchase’ greater powers of
surveillance. The court thereby demonstrated that the hybrid
theory’s essential claim—that the exception clause requires pen
register authority for law enforcement to access cell location
data—is not the only possible reading of that section.
Another odd result produced by reading the exception
clause as the hybrid theory requires was manifested in a case
from the Southern District of West Virginia (“West Virginia
Opinion”).153 That court noted that the exception clause
prohibits a pen register from disclosing the physical location of
the subscriber to a telephone service.154 Because the target of
the police surveillance in the West Virginia Opinion was not
the subscriber to the phone company’s service, but rather was
using another person’s phone, the court held that the phone
user’s cell location data was accessible on the minimal showing
of certified relevance.155 This is problematic for three reasons.
The first is obvious. By accepting the hybrid theory’s initial
premise, that cell location data is accessible via a pen register,
a court is forced to conclude that there is only minimal
procedural protection available for cell phone users who are
not the service subscriber. If this were true, it would mean that
an individual’s privacy interest in being free from having the
government track his or her movements is created by
contracting for cellular telephone service. The second problem
compounds the first. Under the “certified relevance” standard,
a district court could not question law enforcement’s assertion
that the target of the surveillance is not the service
subscriber.156 The West Virginia Opinion exemplified this exact
152
Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 833; see also supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
153
In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing
the Installation and use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device and Cell
Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone (W. Va. Opinion), 415 F. Supp.
2d 663 (S.D. W. Va. 2006).
154
Id. at 665-66; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006).
155
W. Va. Opinion, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 665-66. The court did note that it would
not follow the hybrid theory where a subscriber’s location was sought. In drawing its
distinction, it accepted the premise that a pen register is the proper source of cell
location data, but rejected in dicta the hybrid theory’s applicability to service
subscribers.
156
See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (stating that when considering an
application where the government is held to the evidentiary burden of certified
relevance, “the judge need not—and, indeed, cannot—independently assess the factual
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concern when it stated “[t]he United States certifies that the
fugitive is using another person’s cellphone.”157 The practical
effect of such a rule would permit the government to engage in
warrantless, real-time tracking of individuals anytime a
government agent represents that a suspect is carrying the cell
phone of another.
It is no less invasive of one’s privacy to have one’s
movements tracked when carrying someone else’s cell phone
than it is to be tracked with one’s own cell phone; this is a
necessary result of accepting the hybrid theory and is
inconsistent with the feature of the ECPA that calibrates the
amount of required legal process to the degree of intrusion into
one’s privacy.158 Moreover, if the hybrid interpretation of the
ECPA is the correct one, then the statute is unconstitutional to
the extent it permits the government to monitor cell phone
users’ movements within their homes but without a warrant.159
5. The Precision of Tracking Made Possible by Cell
Location Data
Cell location data can be grouped into various types,
some permitting more precise tracking than others, and some
involving a different amount of voluntarism on the part of the
user.160 For instance, in the first published opinion to reject the
hybrid theory, the government requested prospective cell
location data, but only regarding the individual cell site
activated by the target phone.161 In an application before a
different court, the government requested prospective data, but
from multiple cell sites, susceptible to triangulation, as well as
the signal strength data from each cell site.162 The government
application before that magistrate requested the most precise
data set possible from conventional wireless telephony.163 Had
the request been granted, it would have allowed ongoing, real-

predicate for the government officials’ certification”) (quoting CARR & BELLIA, supra
note 51, § 1:26, at 1-25); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
157
W. Va. Opinion, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
158
See supra note 70.
159
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160
See supra note 45.
161
E.D.N.Y. I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563; see also E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at
295.
162
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749; see also supra text accompanying notes
31-38.
163
See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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time tracking of the subject phone with a high degree of
precision.164
By contrast, in the leading case to accept the hybrid
theory, the government sought, on a prospective basis, cell site
data and facing data generated at the beginning and end of
calls, but not triangulation data, signal strength data, or
automatically generated registration data.165 The split among
the courts cannot be explained by the differences in the data
sets requested by law enforcement in the various cases.
Pointing to the differences in precision made possible by the
data is at best a partial explanation for the split, evidenced by
the split between the Eastern District of New York and
Magistrate Judge Gorenstein’s opinion in S.D.N.Y. I. The
opinions handed down in the Eastern District denied a
government application for less invasive data than the
application which was granted in S.D.N.Y. I.166
Moreover, if the cases accepting the hybrid theory are
best understood as permitting the warrantless locating or
tracking of cell phones when that surveillance is conducted
with limited precision, then their deciding rationale is
unsound; it is certainly not rooted in the text of the ECPA.167 As
one court that rejected the hybrid theory has noted, the federal
statute defining tracking devices does not include a precision
requirement in its definition.168 Yet, every one of the cases that
has accepted the hybrid theory has limited its holding to cell
location data that reveals only generally the location of its
target.169 Those courts’ reluctance to grant law enforcement the
full measure of surveillance capability that the hybrid theory
authorizes is understandable, but there is no principled basis
for limiting the theory’s reach in this way.170 The hybrid courts’
unease suggests that, however convincingly the hybrid theory
might account for the text of the relevant statutes, what it
proposes is just bad policy.
164
It is unclear exactly how precisely the government would have been able to
track the phone; that can never be known unless the concentration and arrangement of
cell towers activated by the phone is also known. See supra text accompanying notes
20-38.
165
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437; see also Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537.
166
Compare E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 295-96, with S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F.
Supp. 2d at 437-38 (denying the same application on rehearing).
167
See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
168
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
169
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
170
See W.D.N.Y., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 218 n.5.
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6. The Lack of Persuasive Legislative History
Both sides of the debate claim to have found support in
the language of the legislative histories of the various statutes
involved in the debate.171 Although there is a significant
amount of skepticism regarding the value of legislative history,
Justice Scalia being its foremost critic, the history of the
statutes relevant to the present debate has been the topic of
constant skirmishing between the two camps in the
controversy.172 Hybrid theorists offer the legislative history of
the USA PATRIOT Act to reinforce their argument’s essential
claim that “signaling information” includes “cell location
data.”173 The quoted history supports the assertion that the
Pen/Trap Statute authorizes the use of pen registers to capture
data from cellular phones in addition to other electronic
communication media, such as email, but it does not shed
much light on whether cell location data should be construed as
“signaling information.” Because this is the only legislative
history that putatively supports the argument that cell location
data is “signaling information,” this appeal to the statute’s
history is hardly convincing. One court that rejected the hybrid
theory likely had this point in mind when it declared that
“[n]othing in the admittedly abbreviated legislative history of
the PATRIOT Act suggests this new definition would extend
the reach of the Pen/Trap Statute to cell phone tracking.”174
The hybrid proponents’ most convincing use of
legislative history regards their interpretation of the exception
clause, codified as part of CALEA.175 Hybrid proponents point to
the first round of testimony given before Congress by former
FBI director Louis Freeh, who was appearing to urge the
enactment of CALEA.176 He stated, “Even when such
generalized location information . . . is obtained from
communications service providers, court orders or subpoenas

171
See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41, 443; Texas I, 396 F. Supp.
2d at 752 n.7, 753-54, 758, 761-65.
172
See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
173
See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39; see also supra text accompanying
notes 101-104.
174
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
175
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43.
176
See id. at 443.
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are required and are obtained.”177 At first blush, the FBI
director’s use of the words “court orders or subpoenas” and not
“warrants issued pursuant to probable cause” seems to bolster
the hybrid argument. This conclusion is significantly
undermined if Director Freeh was only referring to historical
data or to a person’s actual, physical address (readily
identifiable in the erstwhile era of wireline telephony, the
predominant mode of telephony at the time Freeh made these
statements) when he used the term “generalized location
information.”178 Perhaps more to the point, the leading opinion
to adopt the hybrid theory only used the Freeh statement to
support its argument that the exception clause contained in
CALEA can’t be read to “bar[] law enforcement agencies from
obtaining cell site information entirely,” a point not seriously
contended in the opinions rejecting the hybrid theory.179
Courts rejecting the hybrid theory have also relied on
the statements Freeh made before Congress. In one portion of
testimony, he stated that the purpose of CALEA was to
“maintain technological capabilities commensurate with
existing statutory authority.”180 Freeh’s concern was that, as
digital telephony—both wireless and wireline—came to replace
traditional analogue telephony, the existing statutes
authorizing the compelled cooperation of phone companies
would be eroded, and that law enforcement would lose the
ability to “install” pen registers and wiretaps.181 In an attempt
to allay the concerns of privacy advocates, Freeh stated that
CALEA “ensures the maintenance of the status quo,” and
that “the legislation does not enlarge or reduce the
government’s authority to lawfully conduct court-ordered
electronic surveillance.”182 This use of legislative history, while
it tends to strengthen the argument against the hybrid theory,
is ultimately inconclusive. Relying on this testimony to
demonstrate that CALEA was not meant to authorize the use
177
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (quoting Police Access to Advanced
Communications Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2d Session (1994) (statement of Louis
Freeh, Director of the FBI) (emphasis added).
178
See id.
179
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 181-184.
180
Wiretapping Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994).
181
Id.
182
Id.
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of pen registers to track cell phones simply begs the question of
whether such use of pen registers is an expansion of the
government’s pre-digital powers of surveillance or simply
maintenance of the status quo.
The fact that both sides of this debate claim the support
of the same legislative history is not surprising; nor is the fact
that neither snippet of Freeh’s testimony definitively answers
the question of what the critical terms mean. Justice Scalia has
argued that the law is manifested by the “objective indication
of the words [of a statute], rather than the intent of the
legislature.”183 He points out that the attempt to discern
congressional intent from legislative history is flawed in at
least three related ways. First, it invites judges to implement
their own policy preferences under the guise of legislative
intent.184 Second, to suppose an actual intent shared by a
majority of Congress behind any given statute (to say nothing
of such statutory minutiae as is involved in the present
controversy) is to indulge an enormous fiction.185 Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that a majority of the members of Congress
actually thought about and shared an opinion as to how the
terms “signaling information” or “solely pursuant to” should
apply to cell location data. Finally, the sheer volume of
documentation produced in passing new laws means that
litigators and judges turning to legislative history will find
“something for everybody.”186 Rather than asking what
Congress intended but failed to express, the proper inquiry into
legislative intent asks what Congress’ intentions were, as
objectively manifested in the words they actually used.187 The
reasoning in some of the cell location cases exemplify the
problems inherent in relying on legislative history, and
validate Justice Scalia’s critiques of the practice.188
The theory of textualism advanced by Justice Scalia
offers an alternative interpretive technique for resolving
ambiguities such as the ones at the heart of the present
controversy. It urges that words have a limited range of
possible meanings and seeks to determine the most reasonable

183
184
185
186
187
188

SCALIA, supra note 172, at 29.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 16-17
See supra text accompanying notes 171-172.
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interpretation of the words themselves.189 While textualism
does not resort to legislative history, it does consider the
context in which ambiguous words are situated to determine
their meaning.190 Whatever may be said of textualism
generally, relying on the “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris,” produces a
decisive insight in the cell location cases.191 Courts accepting
the hybrid theory have analyzed the critical statutory sections
only in isolation from the body of federal electronic surveillance
law. Those courts’ conclusions, though credible on their own
terms, are inconsistent with the basic design of the ECPA and
counter to the policies embodied in that statute.192
7. The Structural Inconsistencies Created by the
Hybrid Theory
Considering the texts of the three statutory provisions
essential to the hybrid theory within the context of the ECPA’s
regulatory scheme fatally undermines the government’s
argument. As noted in one prominent opinion rejecting the
hybrid theory, the provisions of the ECPA that explicitly
govern access to forms of prospective data contain sealing
requirements and time limits.193 The SCA contains none.194 The
court reasoned that these features of the Pen/Trap Statute and
the SCA indicate that they were tailored to different purposes
and meant to operate separately rather than in tandem.195
Another court noted that accepting the hybrid theory requires
accepting that the “two statutes together accomplish what
neither can alone.”196 This is especially odd given that the
statutory ingredients in the hybrid theory were enacted over a

189
190
191
192

SCALIA, supra note 172, at 24.
See id. at 20-21, 23-24.
Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 829; see also Kerr, supra note 70, at 608-

09.
193
See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 833-36 (noting that wiretaps, which are
inherently prospective, can be authorized for a maximum of thirty days at a time, that
pen/trap authorizations expire after sixty days, and that both wiretap and pen/trap
orders are automatically sealed while orders under the SCA trigger none of these
privacy protections).
194
Id. at 833.
195
Id. at 835.
196
E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
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fifteen-year period, and that, with one exception, they do not
cross-reference one another.197
Another anomaly that the hybrid theory produces in the
structural coherence of the ECPA was noted by Magistrate
Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas: the warrant
requirement for a tracking device would be redundant if law
enforcement can effectively track an individual with a cell
phone.198 While the court’s opinion may have overstated the
case by suggesting that law enforcement could simply install
cell phones on people’s cars instead of actual tracking devices
(thereby obviating the need for a warrant), the point is welltaken that given the ubiquity of cell phone usage, a tracking
device would seldom be necessary if the cell phone could
perform a tracking function while not requiring a warrant.199
Finally, it has been observed that the ECPA requires
greater legal process in order for the government to access data
that is more invasive of an individual’s privacy.200 As part of
this basic design, the authority for pen registers is quite easy to
exercise, representing a judgment on the part of Congress that
phone users have a limited privacy interest in the record of
phone calls they have made.201 At the other end of the ECPA’s
spectrum is the authority for wiretapping, requiring what Orin
Kerr has called the “‘super’ search warrant.”202 Just below the
super warrant in the hierarchy of legal process is the warrant
issued pursuant to probable cause, the normal form of
authorization for installing a tracking device.203 The fact that a
warrant is normally required to track an individual’s
movement suggests that a significant privacy interest is
invaded when law enforcement engages in this type of
surveillance.
One potential response from advocates of the hybrid
theory maintains that traditional pen registers revealed the
location of phone users at the time they were on the phone,
usually in their homes and offices, the very places that the
Supreme Court has held deserve the greatest privacy
197
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764-66. The one cross-reference is a limiting
reference, located within the exception clause of § 1002. Id. at 764; see also supra notes
130-134 and accompanying text.
198
Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 756.
199
See id.
200
Kerr, supra note 70, at 620-21.
201
See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
202
Kerr, supra note 70, at 620.
203
Id.; see also supra note 51.
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protections. That this information was and is accessible
without a warrant suggests that the ECPA also permits cell
location data to be accessible without a warrant, even when it
reveals the phone user is inside his or her home. This
argument fails to acknowledge that technology which permits
the real-time tracking of individuals is clearly more powerful
and more invasive than technology that merely determines a
person was at home or in their office at the time they made a
phone call. The differences are important. First, the cell phone
service subscriber is typically the exclusive user of her cell
phone, whereas ten or fifteen years ago, an entire household
shared a single phone line. This development increases the
certainty—to nearly one hundred percent—that the
government can locate an individual by locating a particular
phone. Second, pen registers on a landline could disclose the
person’s whereabouts only at the time they were making a call,
as opposed to the constant monitoring that cell location data
makes available. This is not a quantitative but a qualitative
difference. The difference is so great that it makes cell location
data functionally indistinguishable from data derived from a
tracking device and completely unlike the list of dialed
numbers derivable from a pen register. Under the ECPA,
whenever the government seeks a greater intrusion into a
person’s privacy, greater legal process is required.204 This
observation suggests that emerging forms of electronic
surveillance—such as cell phone monitoring—should be
regulated according to function and not according to strained
linguistic analyses.
The previous discussion recounted the various critiques
of the hybrid theory offered by the majority line of cases. Of all
the conceptual problems posed by the government’s theory, the
most serious is the observation that the constituent sections of
the ECPA be interpreted with regard to their function.205 The
hybrid theory apparently has no answer to this insight; the
theory’s best defense is a brittle insistence upon one very
particular reading of the relevant statutory sections. This
reading studiously ignores the fact that the government
monitors the movements of a person or thing when it accesses
prospective cell location data, regardless of whether that data
is called “signaling information,” “subscriber records” or “data
204
205
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from a tracking device.” Even the cases accepting the hybrid
theory have limited its impact in a manner that suggests its
central premise—that law enforcement can use electronic
surveillance to monitor a person’s whereabouts with a minimal
amount of judicial oversight—is inconsistent with the policies
behind the ECPA.206
V.

CONCLUSION

The debate over cell location data reflects a general
truth about the current state of electronic media law—it is
outdated and falling further behind.207 The proliferation of
Internet traffic and technological advances in such areas as
data storage and wireless telephony that have taken place in
the last ten years have profoundly changed the way human
communities exchange, store, process, and commodify
information.208 The startling speed of these changes made it
inevitable that the laws regulating the flow of information
would lag behind.209 The Internet, now the most important
information medium for individuals, corporations and
government, is regulated—to the extent it is regulated at all—
by laws modeled on telephonic communications media.210 The
awkward fit between those laws and their new subject has not
gone unnoticed.211 In the context of electronic privacy, courts
have been left to apply a regulatory framework designed for the
previous epoch. The controversy over cell location data takes
place in one small corner of this broad frontier. Striking the
right balance between the values to which we as a free people
are committed and the need to protect ourselves from domestic
and foreign threats is perhaps the most important task facing
our lawmakers.
It is by no means clear where that balance is to be
found, but in our institutions are policies and practices that
have served us throughout our history and that continue to
find application to contemporary problems. Foremost among
them is the doctrine of the separation of powers. Because each
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branch of our government is given a limited sphere of
influence, each serves as a check on the power of the others in
order to preserve the rights and liberties of the sovereign
American people.212 Updating the Executive’s tool kit in its
struggle against both the common criminal and sophisticated
enemies of the state is an important task, but the judiciary has,
since the time of the founding, provided the check that protects
Americans’ privacy from government overreaching.213 Although
the Supreme Court has not extended the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement to many forms of electronic
surveillance,214 Congress has legislated in this area and
imposed greater privacy protections than are required by the
Constitution.215 The following are some suggestions for
amendments to the existing statutes that would explicitly
create a role for judicial oversight regarding cell location data.
1. Clarifying the Scope of the Pen/Trap Statute. The
first step in the hybrid theory posits that cell location data is
accessible via the device (or process) that creates a record of all
numbers dialed by the target phone and that the government
may therefore use the legal authorization for such a record to
locate and track individuals.216 Because of the breadth of its
terms, the Pen/Trap Statute’s application to cell location data
is at least plausible.217 Perhaps Congress used such broad terms
out of a concern that pen registers would be made obsolete by
the change from analogue to digital and from wireline to
wireless telephony. Or perhaps they were concerned that
unforeseen technological changes would quickly render the new
amendments obsolete. Such an interpretation of the Pen/Trap
Statute is at least as plausible as the interpretation of the one
advanced by the hybrid theory.
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) by inserting
language such as “nor shall such information include any data
that would reveal the physical location of the phone user
(except to the extent that the location may be determined from
a wireline-connected telephone number)” after the language in
that subsection that prohibits intercepting the content of
212

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and
the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2006).
213
See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991) (stating that the
separation of powers is the “central guarantee of a just government”).
214
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
215
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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communications.218 This amendment would preclude the use of
pen registers to track cell phones, leaving a warrant issued
under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3117 as the appropriate form
of authority for compelling the disclosure of cell location data.219
Such an amendment would also leave intact the “status quo” to
which Director Freeh referred in his testimony before
Congress—law enforcement agencies could still access pen
register data without learning anything about a cell phone
user’s location.220
2. Rewording the “Exception Clause.” Another possible
amendment would more clearly define Congress’ intention
behind the phrase “solely pursuant to” in the exception clause
of 47 U.S.C. § 1002. If Congress wanted to prohibit the
warrantless tracking of cell phones, this section could be
amended simply by excising the word “solely.” Such change
would end any speculation that this part of CALEA is an
implicit instruction to combine two statutes conveying different
forms of authority so as to authorize a third, remarkably more
powerful form of surveillance. As it reads now, the most
natural reading of the phrase “solely pursuant to” supports the
hybrid theorists’ textual arguments.221 The term “solely” does
indeed suggest the meaning “with another,” even if it is not (as
some courts have held) the only possible meaning.222 In the
absence of some text specifying what that other authority
should be, it is reasonable to expect law enforcement to select
its preferred form of authority and equally reasonable to expect
courts to be divided by the questions raised by government
applications for cell location data. At the very least, if Congress
does intend for § 1002 to act as the bridge between the
Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA, they should amend the section
by replacing the term “subscriber” with “user” in order to avoid
the bizarre result in the West Virginia Opinion.223

218

See 18 U.S.C § 3127(3) (2006).
See supra note 51.
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See supra notes 175-182 and accompanying text. Note also that at least one
other commentator has suggested amending the Pen/Trap Statute, albeit in a slightly
different fashion. Rickey G. Glover, Note, A Probable Nightmare: Lifting the Fog from
the Cellular Surveillance Statutory Catastrophe, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1543, 1581-83
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3. Amending the Stored Communications Act. Congress
could amend the SCA section that completes the hybrid theory
in much the same way as the Pen/Trap Statute if it wanted to
prohibit warrantless cell phone tracking.224 The phrase “or any
information regarding the physical location of the user of such
service” could be inserted into the parentheses excepting the
contents of electronic communications from the aegis of 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). Such an amendment would be a good
idea regardless of whether the other amendments are made.
As one commentator noted, the SCA deals with stored
communications, but is susceptible to the argument that a
communication is “stored” the moment its existence is recorded
by phone company computers.225 The success of such an
argument would turn the statute—with its focus on making
records stored in phone company computers accessible to law
enforcement—into a prospective grant of authority to note calls
as they take place, provided they are “stored” for some trivial
amount of time before being disclosed.226 If the record of cell
towers activated by cell phone transmissions is cognizable as
“other information,” then the government could, in theory,
achieve the same result under the SCA that it sought under
the hybrid theory.227 An amendment that clearly forbade the
release of a phone user’s physical location would prevent this
crafty argument from authorizing cell phone tracking.
Whether or not Congress would want to prohibit
warrantless cell phone tracking is unclear. The legislature
could, of course, explicitly authorize the government to conduct
warrantless cell phone tracking. As long as the target phone is
never carried into an area where its user enjoys a reasonable
expectation of privacy, there would be no constitutional defect
in the application of such a statute.228 This Note has argued,
however, that such a change in the country’s electronic
surveillance regime would be a regression. Congress has
promulgated a scheme that requires a degree of judicial
oversight, commensurate with the inherent invasion of privacy,
by requiring the government to obtain an order authorizing
224

See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006).
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 539.
226
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such surveillance.229 This is good policy, respecting as it does
the tension between liberty and order that must always exist
where a people choose to live freely in a perilous world.
The hybrid theory presents a textual analysis of federal
electronic surveillance laws that is plausible on its own terms,
but fails to explain why cell location data is better analyzed as
pen register data than as data from a tracking device. It cannot
account for the regulatory design of the ECPA, discernible in
the graduated levels of judicial oversight required for more
invasive forms of surveillance230 nor for the fact that once the
government can ascertain an individual’s general location with
cell site data, there is no principled way to prevent the
government from using more sophisticated data sets to track
individuals in real time and with a high degree of precision.231
The alternative theory, by contrast, can account for the
language in the relevant statutes, support the policies
embodied in the ECPA, and retain a meaningful role for the
judiciary in determining, ex ante, how much surveillance the
executive branch may lawfully conduct.232
Law enforcement’s ingenuity is on display in the cell
location cases, and there is cause for satisfaction in the idea
that police agencies are adapting their techniques to take
advantage of emerging technologies. Yet, if we are to preserve
the right to be free from pervasive governmental intrusion in
our private lives, we must be careful how much deference we
accord to law enforcement’s claims of authority.233 Treating cell
location data as analogous to data from a tracking device
imposes a neutral and detached decision-maker between the
police, “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime,” and private citizens.234 A careful reading of the
relevant statutes demonstrates that this conclusion is not only
preferable, it is the one required by the will of Congress.
Timothy Stapleton†
229

CARR & BELLIA, supra, note 51, § 4:77, at p. 4-193.
Id.
231
See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
232
See supra Part IV.B.
233
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”).
234
Id.
†
The author would like to thank Professors Susan Herman and Wendy
Seltzer for their invaluable contributions to this Note.
230

